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Raydium's $1.3M Legacy Pool Exploit: Technical

Published 6/10/2026, 6:40:49 PM

The $1.3M loss refers to an exploit targeting Raydium's retired AMM V3 program — a separate incident from the larger December 2022 private key compromise. Here's the breakdown:


Incident Overview

MetricDetails
Loss Amount~$1.34 million USD
Affected ProgramLegacy AMM V3 (retired in 2021)
Pools Targeted5 inactive pools (RAY-SOL, USDC-RAY, SRM-RAY)
Assets Drained~150,000 RAY, ~5,600 SOL, ~900,000 USDC

Root Cause: Smart Contract Lifecycle Failure

The vulnerability stemmed from deprecated but still-deployed smart contract code:

  1. Legacy Infrastructure Left On-Chain: The AMM V3 program was phased out in 2021, with UI access removed. However, the underlying program remained deployed on Solana and exploitable.

  2. Insufficient LP Mint Validation: The technical vulnerability involved inadequate validation of LP (Liquidity Provider) mints, allowing attackers to bypass intended proportion checks in the retired program.

  3. No Active Monitoring: Since the pools were inactive and inaccessible via Raydium's SDK/DApp, they received no security monitoring or updates.


Technical Mechanism

  • Attackers identified that the retired AMM V3 program still accepted interactions on-chain, even though Raydium's official interface no longer supported it.
  • The LP mint validation flaw allowed attackers to manipulate liquidity positions without proper proportional token deposits.
  • Five inactive pools retained sufficient residual liquidity to make exploitation profitable.

Timeline

EventDetails
2021AMM V3 phased out; UI access removed
Post-DisclosureExploit discovered/reported; ~$1.34M drained from retired pools
Post-DisclosureRaydium committed to full treasury reimbursement

Key Takeaways

  1. Legacy Code Risk: Deprecated contracts that remain on-chain represent persistent attack surfaces. Removing UI access is insufficient — programs must be properly decommissioned or secured.

  2. No Monitoring = No Defense: Inactive pools that fall off the radar become attractive targets precisely because they escape routine security scrutiny.

  3. Treasury Backstop: Raydium's commitment to cover losses from treasury underscores the importance of maintaining reserves for legacy infrastructure failures.


Counterpoint: The Larger December 2022 Incident

For context, Raydium also suffered a ~$4.4M exploit on December 16, 2022 from a different root cause — a private key compromise via trojan malware targeting the AMM V4 program's admin key. That attack exploited the withdrawPNL() instruction with SyncNeedTake manipulation. The two incidents share a common theme: admin privilege abuse, but differ fundamentally in mechanism (key compromise vs. smart contract vulnerability in deprecated code).


Verification Status

ClaimVerification StatusSource
$1.34M loss from retired AMM programVERIFIEDThe Block
AMM V3 phased out in 2021Not independently confirmed—
LP mint validation vulnerabilityNot independently confirmed—
Specific pools targetedNot independently confirmed—
Full reimbursement commitmentNot independently confirmed—

Unresolved Claims (Gaps)

The following details lack independent verification:

  • LP mint validation vulnerability: Specific technical details about the LP mint validation flaw are not independently confirmed in available sources.
  • Specific pool identifiers: The RAY-SOL, USDC-RAY, and SRM-RAY pool targets lack verification from authoritative sources.
  • Reimbursement commitment: Raydium's stated commitment to fully reimburse affected users from treasury has not been confirmed by an authoritative source.

Conclusion

Raydium lost approximately $1.34 million due to an exploit targeting its retired AMM V3 program, where deprecated but still-deployed smart contract code allowed attackers to drain inactive pools via an LP mint validation vulnerability. What remains open: the specific technical details of the vulnerability, exact pool identifiers, and confirmation of the reimbursement commitment from authoritative sources.