Ethereum Glamsterdam Upgrade: L1 Fees &
Published 6/17/2026, 1:45:10 PM
Overview
Glamsterdam is Ethereum's next major hard fork, combining the Consensus Layer upgrade "Gloas" (named after star Gliese) with the Execution Layer upgrade "Amsterdam" (named after a Devconnect host city). It follows Fusaka (December 3, 2025) and precedes Hegotá.
Target mainnet activation: H2 2026 (ethereum.org), with some internal working targets pointing toward Q3 2026 (end of August) — contingent on cross-client implementation parity and ePBS readiness. The scope freeze already passed on August 21, 2025, and a stable multi-client devnet is running as of May 27, 2026. [Source: https://everstake.one/blog/ethereum-glamsterdam-upgrade]
Effect on L1 Fees
Glamsterdam addresses L1 fees through capacity expansion, state growth control, and repricing — working in complementary directions.
Capacity Expansion
| Change | EIP | Impact |
|---|---|---|
| Block gas limit: 60M → 200M | — | ~3.3× throughput increase; reduces per-tx fees under normal demand [Source: https://everstake.one/blog/ethereum-glamsterdam-upgrade] |
| Intrinsic tx gas reduction | EIP-2780 | Lowers cost of transfers to existing EOA accounts [Source: https://everstake.one/blog/ethereum-glamsterdam-upgrade] |
| General opcode repricing | EIP-7904 | Aligns gas costs with actual resource consumption |
Under normal demand conditions, the 200M gas limit is the single largest factor pushing L1 fees lower. The preceding Pectra upgrade (activated May 7, 2025) already repriced calldata from 16 to 42 gas/byte via EIP-7623, and doubled blob targets from 3→6 (max 6→9) per block via EIP-7691. Fusaka (December 3, 2025) introduced PeerDAS for further blob scaling. Glamsterdam builds on this by expanding L1 execution capacity further.
State Growth Control
| Change | EIP | Impact |
|---|---|---|
| State creation gas cost increase (CPSB framework) | EIP-8037 | Caps state database growth at ~120 GiB/year — keeps standard hardware viable for node operators long-term [Source: https://everstake.one/blog/ethereum-glamsterdam-upgrade] |
| State read cost repricing | EIP-8038 | Aligns pricing with disk lookup overhead |
These measures are a supply-side stabilizer: as state grows, pricing adjustments prevent disk and sync costs from becoming a centralization pressure on validators.
Calldata Repricing
| Change | EIP | Impact |
|---|---|---|
| Calldata floor increase | EIP-7976 | Raises the minimum cost of calldata to reflect bandwidth burden — pushes rollups further toward blob-based data availability [Source: https://everstake.one/blog/ethereum-glamsterdam-upgrade] |
| Access list pricing recalibration | EIP-7981 | Reprices access lists given that EIP-7928 makes access information protocol-enforced |
Effect on Block-Building
The most structurally significant change in Glamsterdam is EIP-7732 (ePBS), which restructures block production fundamentally.
ePBS: Enshrined Proposer-Builder Separation (EIP-7732)
Today, validators use external MEV-Boost software and trusted relays to outsource block building — creating centralization risk at the relay layer. ePBS enshrine this separation directly in the protocol:
| Feature | Detail |
|---|---|
| Permissionless builders | Builders register by staking ETH via a new withdrawal credential prefix (0x03) — anyone meeting collateral requirements can compete [Source: https://ethereum.org/roadmap/glamsterdam] |
| Relay elimination | Builders submit signed bid commitments (block_hash + value in Gwei) to the beacon chain directly — no relay intermediary [Source: https://everstake.one/blog/ethereum-glamsterdam-upgrade] |
| Immediate payment | Payment is deducted immediately at bid inclusion, not after payload reveal — a cryptoeconomic replacement for relay trust [Source: https://ethereum.org/roadmap/glamsterdam] |
| Payload Timeliness Committee (PTC) | A subset of validators certifies whether the builder released the payload on time. If a builder withholds a committed payload, they pay anyway (the "empty case") [Source: https://everstake.one/blog/ethereum-glamsterdam-upgrade] |
| Censorship resistance | "Prevents any single actor from controlling which transactions are included" [Source: https://everstake.one/blog/ethereum-glamsterdam-upgrade] |
The result: block building shifts from a trust-based relay infrastructure to protocol-enforced rules. Solo stakers gain easier MEV market participation without managing complex relay configurations.
Parallel Block Execution (EIP-7928)
EIP-7928 introduces block-level access lists, enabling clients to pre-declare which accounts and storage slots a block will access. This allows state root computation and state updates to proceed without waiting for full sequential execution — supporting the higher 200M gas limit with faster, more deterministic block validation. [Source: https://everstake.one/blog/ethereum-glamsterdam-upgrade]
6-Second Slots (EIP-7782)
Glamsterdam shortens the slot time from 12 to 6 seconds, effectively doubling proposer frequency. Combined with ePBS, this increases the cadence of competitive builder auctions.
Combined Summary
| Change | EIP | Effect on L1 Fees | Effect on Block-Building |
|---|---|---|---|
| Gas limit → 200M | — | ↓ Per-tx fees under normal demand | — |
| Intrinsic tx gas reduction | EIP-2780 | ↓ Cost for simple transfers | — |
| State growth cap (120 GiB/yr) | EIP-8037 | Stabilizes node costs long-term | — |
| Calldata floor increase | EIP-7976 | Pushes rollups to blobs | — |
| ePBS — relay elimination | EIP-7732 | — | Trustless, permissionless builder market |
| Parallel block execution | EIP-7928 | — | Faster, more deterministic validation |
| 6-second slots | EIP-7782 | — | Doubles proposer frequency |
Risks & Open Questions
- ePBS complexity is the primary timeline risk — implementing trustless builder-proposer exchange with PTC and the empty-case penalty is technically demanding.
- The 200M gas limit target may be revisited depending on client performance testing under realistic mainnet load.
- Specific parameters (exact EIP-7904 opcode adjustments, EIP-8037 CPSB rates) remain in active specification.
The mainnet date remains contingent on cross-client implementation parity and ePBS readiness. Once activated, expect a structurally more competitive MEV market with reduced relay centralization risk, and meaningfully lower L1 fees under normal demand due to the 3.3× gas limit increase — though calldata repricing continues nudging rollups toward blob-based data availability.
Next Steps
- Monitor ePBS readiness: Track cross-client implementation parity progress toward a locked mainnet date — the single biggest risk to the H2 2026 target.
- Assess builder landscape: Evaluate how the permissionless builder market (via
0x03credential staking) will reshape MEV revenue distribution for validators and solo stakers.
If you'd like to model L1 fee scenarios under different gas limit assumptions or track ePBS devnet progress, I can run that analysis.